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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
KAREN DIANE ANDERSON BAGGS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

DENNIS R. ANDERSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

13422

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to domesticate a Wyoming divorce
decree and obtain judgment for support arrearages thereunder.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment
for plaintiff, later modified, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks judgment for all support arrearages
as a matter of law, and attorney's fees, or that failing, a
new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1970, plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Natrona County, Wyoming. Plaintiff was
awarded custody of the three minor children of the parties, and defendant was directed to pay the sum of $200.00
per month for support of said children. Defendant made
those payments through September, 1971. During parts
of September and October, 1971, plaintiff was taken ill.
As a result of lost work, she was in desperate economic
condition and contacted defendant inquiring of the October payment and advising him of her difficulty. T. 1012. Plaintiff called defendant several times during the
month of October, and finally he agreed to make up the
October payment and make the November payment if
she would meet with him on November 1, 1971. T. 12,
L. 8-20. At that time defendant paid $400.00 and promised to make a $200.00 payment for December, 1971, in
return for plaintiff relieving him from further support
obligations. T. 12, L. 18-20; T. 193, L. 26-30; T. 194, L.
1-4. Plaintiff had no intention of relieving him from his
obligation, but signed the agreement simply to get the
money she needed so badly. T. 13, L. 2-21. About two
weeks later, defendant agreed with plaintiff's fiance, Mr.
Ritchie Baggs, that he would allow Mr. Baggs to adopt
the children but was not giving anything else. T. 14, L.
9-17. Plaintiff and Mr. Baggs were married November
19, 1971, defendant paid $100.00 toward his obligation for
December, 1971, and no further payments were made.
At no time were the support arrearages used as a lever
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to compel adoption or vice-versa, T. 68, L. 22-30; T. 69,
L. 1-20.
As a result of Mr. Baggs' employment, it was necessary for him to be away for three months beginning March
6, 1972, and plaintiff was apprehensive that defendant
may make things difficult for her with Mr. Baggs away.
T. 15, L. 15; T. 15-16, L. 30, 1-4. Accordingly, plaintiff
and Mr. Baggs determined to forego any action against
defendant until they could be together to the outcome.
T. 41, L. 19-22. Upon Mr. Baggs' return, he consulted
counsel to proceed to adopt the children, T. 41-43. When
defendant refused to proceed with the adoption, plaintiff
felt he should make up support payments, T. 16, L. 10-30,
and defendant was made aware of plaintiff's demand for
support payments on July 17, 1972. Formal demand was
made on defendant July 25, 1972, which he acknowledged
and refused. Formal demand was again made September
14, 1972, whereupon defendant agreed to begin payments
and make up arrearages, Record on Appeal P. 44, PreTrial Order pp. 52-54. On September 27, 1972, plaintiff
filed a complaint against defendant seeking to domesticate
the Wyoming decree and obtain an order directing defendant to pay support arrearages. Further negotiations
were conducted until December 14, 1972, when defendant
was served. On January 5, 1973, Default Judgment was
entered against defendant, said judgment being set aside
February 20, 1973.
On May 8, 1973, trial was held, the Wyoming decree was domesticated, and plaintiff was granted judg-
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ment for all support arrearages (emphasis added) on
May 25, 1973, Record on Appeal 55-56. On May 31, 1973,
defendant moved for amendment of judgment which was
heard on June 20, 1973. On June 29, 1973, the court
amended its judgment, disallowing support arrearages
from December, 1972, through July, 1973, fifty-two (52)
days after trial (emphasis added). Plaintiff's motions for
reconsideration were denied on July 30, 1973.
In the meantime, defendant was earning $700.00 per
month through June, 1972, $908.00 per month through
November, 1972, and $1,066.00 per month from December,
1972, to trial, May 8, 1973, and has no other dependents.
T. 59, L. 10-30; T. 60, L. 1-5. He borrowed money before
the November 1, 1971 agreement to pay Mrs. Baggs. T.
64. L, 12-20 (emphasis added). Following the agreement
he borrowed money for new furniture to be repaid at
$25.60 per month, T. 65, L. 13-16. "Later on" during the
summer of 1972 he purchased a new automobile for
$3,750.00 to be repaid at $118.00 per month. T. 54, L. 7;
T. 64, L. 1-9. He further moved to a $175.00 per month
apartment from a $40.00 per month apartment. After he
became aware of plaintiff's demands for support arrearages he again borrowed $1,200.00, T. 64, L. 21-30; T. 66,
L. 1-5. Thus, from November 1, 1971, to July, 1972, defendant obligated himself for only $278.60 per month,
while making from $700.00 - $1,066.00 per month (emphasis added).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE NOVEMBER 1,1971 AGREEMENT DID
NOT RELIEVE D E F E N D A N T OF HIS
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
First, the agreement is not a valid contract. As noted
in plaintiff's affidavit, as well as her testimony, the agreement was extorted from her under duress and thus rendered voidable. T. 13, L. 2-21, Record on Appeal 3334. Further, it is clear from the affidavits, testimony, and
pleadings on file, that plaintiff at no time ratified the
agreement.
The agreement must fail for lack of consideration.
It is well established that "neither doing nor promising
to do any act which one is already legally bound to the
promise to do, will furnish sufficient consideration for
the counter promise." Simpson on Contracts §58. In the
instant case, defendant promises to do absolutely nothing
he was not already legally bound to do, as he owed plaintiff $400.00 on the date of the agreement, and would owe
her $200.00 for December, 1971, when the $200.00 payment was due under the agreement. T. 62, L. 26-30.
Second, the agreement should not be enforced as it
is contrary to Utah law. Under Utah law, a release from
the wife of all support obligations is of no effect, since
future support cannot be the subject of a bargain and
sale between husband and wife. Price v. Price, 4 U. 2d
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153 (1955), affirmed, McClure v. Dowell, 15 U. 2d 324
(1964); French v. Johnson, 16 U. 2d 360 (1965). See also
Ditmar v. Ditmar, (Wash.) 293 P. 2d 759 (1956).
No cases decided under Utah law, particularly Larsen
v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224 (1956), which purported to apply
an estoppel theory to accumulated support arrearages,
stand for the proposition that future payments can be bargained away. In the instant case, defendant is relying
on an agreement which related in no way to arrearages,
but to future payments.
The proposition that future payments may not be
released is well established in other judisdictions, Cervantes v. Cervantes, 203 S. W. 2d 143 (1947), and Kelly
v. Kelly, 47 S. W. 2d 762 (1932).
It is apparent that the agreement is not even a valid
contract and wholly unenforceable between the parties.
But even if the court finds the agreement has some kind
of validity, defendant should not be relieved from his
support obligations thereunder, since the parties cannot
bargain away a support obligation, particularly a future
obligation. Should the court in turn find against plaintiff on both of the aforesaid matters, there can be no
doubt that the effectiveness of the agreement terminated
July 25, 1972, when defendant was so notified.
POINT II.
D E F E N D A N T SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED FROM A PORTION OF HIS SUP-
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PORT OBLIGATION ON A THEORY OF ACQUIESCENCE, ESTOPPEL OR LACHES.
At the inception, it should be noted that defendant
alleged and the court found plaintiff's acquiescence in
only 7 months of support payments, while all cases indulging an estoppel theory invariably involve many years
of acquiescence. See 137 A. L. R. 884.
The leading Utah Case, Larsen v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224
(1956), although thoroughly emasculated by later cases,
involved 9 years of no support payments. Even after the
case was remanded on the theory that estoppel could be
considered, said theory was applied to only 3 years of the
period. Even assuming any similarity with the instant
case, Larsen should have little effect, since French v.
Johnson and McClure v. Dowell.
In McClure v. Dowell, 15 U. 2d 324 (1964), the court
rejected estoppel in a case involving non-payment of support for a 2 year period on a foreign decree as in the instant case. In addition, the court limited Larsen. In
French v. Johnson, 16 U. 2d 360 (1965), the court further
limited Larsen in denying estoppel in a case involving 10
years of non-payment of support. In Hall v. Hall, 7 U. 2d
413, a 1958 case involving 5 years of non-payment, in
which the wife thwarted the husband's efforts to pay,
the court awarded a judgment on arrearages.
Even if the court should consider the instant case
as somehow even "qualifying" for consideration of an estoppel defense, it is well established that the defendant
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must show that he has been materially prejudiced by the
plaintiff's delay in asserting her rights and substantially
changed his position in reliance thereon. Time alone will
not support such an inference. See 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation §874. In the instant case, defendant
has simply not done so, and remains, as always, in a very
good position to discharge his obligations. As seen in
defendant's own testimony at trial, he changed his position very little indeed for one making from $700.00 to
$1,066.00 per month. During the period when plaintiff
allegedly acquiesced, defendant bought furniture at $25.60
per month and he may have purchased a new automobile
during the period. Even if the court properly found a
change of position of sufficient dollar amount to support
an estoppel, the courts of Utah have never allowed an
obligor to avoid child support because he lived in a luxury
apartment and had to pay for a new car.
It is apparent that the instant case doesn't even approach the facts of those cases in which estoppel has been
considered; but, even more clearly, defendant has certainly not changed his position sufficient to even qualify
for application of the theory.
Even if the court chooses to not consider the validity
of the November 1, 1971 agreement per se, but rather
to focus upon the agreement as evidence of plaintiff's
conduct giving rise to defendant's theory of estoppel, it
is apparent that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, as well as the subsequent acts
and representations of plaintiff and her husband, in no
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way suggests a pattern of acquiescence; and, in fact,
would suggest that plaintiff and her husband were relying
on defendant's representations regarding the disposition
of the children of the parties. Plaintiff had good and
valid reasons for not seeking to enforce defendant's support obligation, with her husband out of town for 3 months
and defendant's prior behavior toward her.
To carry a finding of estoppel in a case such as this
to its logical extreme, would enable any unscrupulous
obligor to effectively avoid his support obligations for
any period of time, however short, by simply inducing
the obligee to forego enforcement.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HER EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE
WYOMING DECREE.
The general view is that where the court has discretion to utilize equitable remedies as well as award suit
money, said money may be awarded on a foreign judgment. See 18 A. L. R. 2d 856, and there is no evidence
in the instant case that plaintiff had any income or assets.
The court may award suit money under 30-3-3 Utah
Code Ann. 1953 (as amended). Further, Utah Statutes
relating to divorce do not limit the discretion of the court
with regard to suit money to domestic cases, and Utah
Code Annotations are replete with cases vesting the
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court with discretion to award suit money and none of
those cases specifically limit said discretion to actions
prosecuted under Utah law.
In Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (1950), it was well
established that suit money may be awarded on enforcement of a foreign support decree. Further, in Oravee v»
Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 252 P. 2d
364 (1953), the court found upon a suit to enforce a foreign decree, "The superior court had jurisdiction to award
support money for the support of the minor children, for
attorney's fees and costs."
It is well established that a foreign decree must be
given full faith and credit. Finally, and, absent a showing
to the contrary, it is presumed foreign law is similar to
Utah law, Tolman v. Wassom, 16 U. 2d 258 (1965), Hunt
v. Monroe, 91 P. 269 (1907).
POINT IV.
THE DEFENDANT INDUCED PLAINTIFF
TO TEMPORARILY FOREGO ENFORCEMENT OF HIS SUPPORT OBLIGATION BY
AGREEING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND TO ADOPT THE CHILDREN.
It is clear from plaintiff's testimony that defendant's
representations with regard to the children played no
small part in her decision to give defendant a chance to
allow her husband to adopt the children. T. 14, L. 9-17.
Fundamental to the assertion of an estoppel is that
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the party seeking to assert same must be acting in good
faith, 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation §79. In the
instant case, defendant knew full well why plaintiff had
not sought to enforce the support obligation; and, after
inducing her with the agreement to adopt, he refused the
adoption and sought to rely on his own misconduct — the
very antithesis of estoppel!
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN HEARING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT.
On May 25, 1973, some 18 days after trial, the court
awarded plaintiff judgment for all arrearages and defendant made a Motion To Amend on the theory that
the court had failed to consider Larsen v. Larsen.
Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 59, U. R. C. P.,
plaintiff's Motion does not set forth a ground thereunder
not already considered by the court. At trial, the court
was made well aware of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 U. 2d 224
(1956), upon which plaintiff relied in his Motion. T.
77, L. 28-30; T. 78, L. 1-30. While it is clear that hearing and granting a Motion To Amend is discretionary, that discretion may be abused when there is no
showing of one of the grounds in Rule 59. Tangaro v.
Marrero, 13 U. 2d 290 (1962). In the instant case, it can
be seen that the court was made well aware of the authorities relied upon by defendant at trial and made its ruling
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in favor of plaintiff. Defendant's Motion To Amend, then,
was improper because defendant was simply asking for
reconsideration of his case.
Further, as the facts indicate, the court's ruling on
defendant's Motion was made a full 52 days after trial.
Without benefit of transcript, it would be unreasonable
as a matter of law to attribute to the court any independent recollection of evidence taken in a 2% hour trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff should have judgment for all support arrearages as a matter of law, and attorney's fees, or that failing, a new trial on the following grounds:
1. The agreement purporting to relieve defendant
of his child support obligation is invalid both as a contract and to effectuate a release of future support.
2. Defendant is not entitled to relief from a portion
of his support obligation on a theory of acquiescence, estoppel or laches, since plaintiff did nothing upon which
defendant could reasonably rely and defendant did not
act in good faith.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees
for her efforts to enforce the terms of the Wyoming Decree, because it was necessary that plaintiff enforce said
Decree and she was without funds to compensate counsel.
4. Defendant induced plaintiff to forego enforcement of his obligation.
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5. The Court improperly amended the original Judgment entered on behalf of plaintiff for her full support
obligation.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES Z. DAVIS
Attorney for Plaintiff
1101 First Security Bank Bldg,
Ogden, Utah 84401
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